The Blog / World News

This section is an extract from Le Beck’s Weekly Security Brief that provides in-depth insight on more strategic issues affecting the MENA region.

After seven months of deadlock and several fruitless attempts in recent weeks to form a government, Lebanese President Michel Aoun intervened to avoid what he described as a national “catastrophe”, launching a new initiative of “possible solutions” centring primarily on resolving the issue of the representation of six pro-Syrian/pro-Hezbollah Sunni MPs. This issue is the last major obstacle to the formation of the new government, as Hezbollah insists (by withholding the names of their designated ministers and thus blocking government formation) that the six Sunni MPs be represented in the new government via PM-designate Saad Hariri’s Cabinet share of the government positions. At this time, while the specific details of Aoun’s initiative have not been disclosed, it remains unclear what solution he could propose that would be accepted by the various parties. For their part, the six MPs in question emphasised that they “will not accept being represented by any bloc”, with MP Jihad Samad going so far as to suggest that they could escalate to demanding “more than just one minister”.

Hezbollah’s demand that the six “independent” Sunni MPs be represented may seem anecdotal, yet it is perceived (likely accurately) by Hariri as an effort by the Shiite party and its allies to change the political landscape in Lebanon in the long-term. Hariri’s opposition to their representation is based on the argument that the six MPs stood in the elections under the umbrella of other political blocs, which have already been accounted for in the Cabinet allocations. The Sunni MPs are, indeed, known to be close to both Hezbollah and to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and their representation as Sunnis, rather than as part of the pro-Hezbollah/Syria camp, while technically respects the sectarian balance in Lebanon does offset a more implicit equilibrium between the main political forces in the country. Beyond that, in the long-term, even recognising the Sunni MPs as a legitimate political force (rather than a mosaic of isolated Sunni politicians) breaks the de facto monopoly that Hariri’s Future Movement has had on Sunni representation thus far and creates a potential rival to the main Sunni party.

To tackle the issue, several initiative have been proposed. There are for instance, speculation that Aoun’s initiative proposed that the MPs would be represented from his own share. Building on this is the idea that the minister appointed could be someone other than one of these specific six MPs. Hariri also rejected another suggestion by caretaker FM and Free Patriot Movement leader Gebran Bassil that involved increasing the number of government ministers from 30 to 32 to more easily include one of the Sunni MPs. These proposals, however, are largely missing the point. They address the issue as more of a technical one,  while de facto giving some legitimacy to the claim that the six “independent” MPs should be represented one way or another – something that Hariri’s camp staunchly opposes.

The current stalemate, while focused on an apparently marginal issues, is thus critical and may, as a result, take even more time to resolve. The fact that Hezbollah and its allies are making such a move now underscores their likely assessment that their position has become stronger and Hariri’s weaker, forcing him to eventually “cave in”. The Sunni leader was, indeed, impacted by the November 2017 crisis that saw him resigning (via a speech from Saudi Arabia) and may have cost him some support among his own constituency. Such fragility was further highlighted this year by his underwhelming performance in the elections, where his party lost multiple seats. On the broader, regional level, the strengthening of the Assad regime in Syria may also play a role in Hezbollah’s decision to start trying to change the political realities in Lebanon by giving the pro-Syria camp some additional confidence, while also bolstering the idea that the country needs to accept its new regional environment – one marked by the return of Syria’s influence.

On the other hand, however, Hariri may also feel that his position still enables him to draw certain red lines. While his political opponent may flaunt the idea of replacing him as the current caretaker PM, there is no clear alternative to Hariri. Furthermore, at a time when the US is increasing its pressure on Iran, and as other anti-Iran US allies are pushing for Washington to start sanctioning Lebanon more broadly, Hariri may feel that he more needed now than ever. The presence of a known anti-Syrian and anti-Hezbollah figure at the head of the Lebanese government, indeed, may act to shield Lebanon against such attempts.

Overall, this means that both sides are effectively playing a “game of chicken” in which they expect the other will cave before them. As such, and despite the optimistic tones from various figures in the caretaker government (including Hariri and Berri), what is known (and rumoured) about Aoun’s initiative suggests that he will be unsuccessful in breaking the stalemate – unless one of the two sides does flinch. This also means that, despite its potential negative socio-economic impact, a protracted political crisis should not be ruled out.

This section is an extract from Le Beck’s Weekly Security Brief that provides in-depth insight on more strategic issues affecting the MENA region.

The disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi will shortly enter its third week (see Oct. 1-7 Weekly Security Brief) and despite speculation and various accusations, what exactly happened remains unclear. At this time, Saudi Arabia maintains its original position that Khashoggi left the consulate, although there has yet to be video evidence showing his exit. Turkish media, for their part, released some CCTV footage, with officials claiming that they have video and audio evidence that indicates Khashoggi was killed, which Riyadh denies. These claims, however, are not without some discrepancies, including the revelation that footage allegedly showing a member of the 15-man Saudi team was taken in 2013 and not on October 2.

Although the circumstances surrounding his disappearance remain unclear, there are already consequences for Saudi Arabia on the political, diplomatic, and even business scene. Saudi equities, for example, took a hit in the aftermath of comments by US President Donald Trump who both indicated that he didn’t want the incident to interfere with Saudi arms purchases while also promising “severe punishment” and/or “very powerful” consequences in the event that Khashoggi was, in fact, killed at the Consulate. In addition, the former US Energy Secretary suspended his position on the board of NEOM, a planned cross-border mega-city; one lobbying firm reportedly cancelled its contract with Riyadh; and multiple participants – both news outlets and companies (including Uber, JP Morgan, and Ford) – pulled out of their participation in an upcoming investor conference in the Saudi capital.

These actions highlight the fact that, regardless of whether or not Saudi Arabia was responsible for the disappearance, there appears to be the perception that it was. Contributing to this are, for example, Turkish statements that Riyadh is not cooperating with the ongoing investigation and various reports claiming that, prior to his disappearance, Saudi Arabia was attempting without success to convince Khashoggi to return.

Assumption of Saudi involvement can also contribute to concerns regarding both the rule of law and perceived irrational decision-making, both of which have already come under scrutiny in recent years: the former during the 2017 corruption arrests (there were and still are allegations that this was as much a power play as it was a fight against corruption) and the latter during incidents like Lebanese PM Saad Hariri’s 2017 announced resignation from the Saudi capital (Riyadh is persistently accused of detaining him in an effort to increase pressure on Hezbollah). Such concerns, whether justified or not, can impact the willingness and interest of companies and investors in doing business with and in the country, damaging ongoing efforts by authorities to send the opposite message, including through social reform like permitting women to drive and developing the entertainment sector.

Perception of Saudi involvement in Khashoggi’s disappearance is having consequences, but governments will wait until dust settles. The fact is that if Khashoggi was killed and if this was ordered by the Saudi government, it would represent a highly irrational move: targeting a prominent journalist living in the US and doing so on foreign soil is highly risky under any circumstances. In other words, the potential benefits of silencing a sometimes critic (Khashoggi had, for instance, also praised certain reform efforts) does not appear to be worth the consequences discussed above.

Saudi leadership is also pushing back against these allegations and the seemingly accompanying assumption of its involvement). Along with denials and efforts to emphasise that there is, in fact, a Saudi team in Turkey assisting with the investigation, some local media outlets are alleging that this crisis was manufactured by Turkey, Iran, and Qatar in order to damage the country’s reputation. Such accusations indicate that the current rift with Qatar is liable to only be cemented further by this situation. Moreover, and more importantly, they have threatened to retaliate in kind to any sanctionsthat may be levied.

At this time, and while this threat and Trump’s comments certainly hold the potential for relations to be strained between the two allies (and with other countries calling for a probe), it is unlikely that governments will make a concrete move until more is known about Khashoggi’s whereabouts. In this context, absent concrete evidence of Saudi involvement, Le Beck assesses that retaliatory measures will be limited if they are implemented at all.